Home grown talent

When Theo Epstein took over the General Manager position before the 2003 season, he said he was going to turn the Red Sox into a "$100 million player development machine", meaning that they would develop their own players, so that they wouldn't have to go out and overspend on free agents. Now, more than ever, that philosophy is critical to success, given the rates at which teams are resigning their own players. Even small to mid market teams, such as the Reds, Mariners, and White Sox are resigning star players to often extremely long deals to prevent them from reaching free agency. The kings of this strategy are the Tampa Bay Rays, who have Evan Longoria under contract through 2023 (no, that isn't a typo) thanks to two different six year extensions, the first of which paid him only $17.5 million for six years (total, not annually), plus three club options totaling $30 million for the 2014, 2015, and 2016 seasons. On top of that they have super utility player Ben Zobrist signed through 2015 for very reasonable salaries and burgeoning ace Matt Moore signed through 2019, if all his options are picked up.

So what does that mean for the Red Sox and other big market teams? Quite simply, if you don't develop from within you'll be forced to spend more money to get less production on the free agent market. Given the importance of developing from within, I thought I'd take a look at the Red Sox history in developing talent and where they are headed from here.

As you can see from the chart, the 2013 opening day lineup had more home grown players than any other year since 2003, when Epstein took over. A few minor notes about the chart - both Nixon and Nomar were still on the roster in 2004, however they did not start opening day. Nomar was limited to under 40 games before being traded and Nixon played 48 games, thanks to a variety of injuries. Because both were starters, but hurt, I've included them in the 2004 total. Also, I am counting Varitek as home grown, despite originally coming up through the Mariners' system, as he was a AA prospect when he was acquired and was not particularly highly rated at the time of his trade.

Now granted, Iglesias and Bradley were only in the lineup due to injuries to Stephen Drew and David Ortiz, respectively, but the new wave of talent may finally be arriving in Boston. Also, you might note that most of the bars stick around for six or seven years, which is how long it takes to accrue enough service time to become a free agent. For example, you can see the core of the 2007 - 2012 teams were Youkilis, Pedroia, and Ellsbury, but that the Red Sox are starting to see some of those players depart. Dustin Pedroia, who was in his seventh opening day lineup in 2013, isn't going anywhere, thanks to a contract extension through 2014 with a team option for 2015, but Youkilis was traded away before becoming a free agent and Ellsbury will likely either be traded or allowed to walk following this season.


With the departure of Youkilis and the imminent departure of Ellsbury, getting this new influx of talent is critical. The Red Sox have already anointed Middlebrooks as Youkilis' successor, thanks to a great few months last season, and Bradley turned heads in spring training with his .500 OBP, which he's managed to keep up for the first two games of the regular season as well. Xander Bogaerts may force his way into the discussion, after dominating high A and AA as a 19 year old, but at the moment his two most likely positions, shortstop and third base, already have young, cost controlled players manning them, in Middlebrooks and Iglesias. Outfielder Bryce Brentz reached AAA last  and struggled mightily, but a good season and he could be in consideration for an outfield job next year, should Ellsbury depart. Beyond Brentz and Bogaerts, the upper levels of the minors do not have any prospects who could make a difference in Boston over the next two years.


On the other side of the ball, things are not nearly as interesting. The Red Sox have really only used three starting pitchers they developed in the last decade - Derek Lowe, Jon Lester, Clay Buchholz, and recently, Felix Doubront. Lowe was a staple on the Red Sox, albeit in a wide variety of roles from 1998 to 2004, when he was allowed to depart as a free agent following the World Series win. Since Lester's dramatic return from non-Hogkins lymphoma, which saw him go from being diagnosed with the disease to clinching the Red Sox sweep of the Rockies in the World Series in his very first post season start. Lester's 2012 was one of the worst in the major leagues, you can do a lot of damage with 200 innings with an ERA approaching 5.00, but he retains the skills to be a potential ace. Buchholz has been up and down with the Red Sox as well, with a 2011 cut short by injuries and a horrendous start to the 2012 season that marred his final line, but hopefully with the return of former pitching coach John Farrell both Buchholz and Lester can return to form. Doubront remains a rather raw, unfinished product; he has great stuff and can strike out a lot of batters, but neither the approach nor the results are there yet. If the Red Sox hasn't been so destroyed by injuries last year, he likely would have returned to AAA. However, with the lack of depth and Doubront being able to hold his own last year, he has another crack at the rotation for 2013.

While the major league home grown pitchers haven't been as interesting as the hitters, the reverse is true for the upper levels of the minors. Thanks to the Red Sox convincing the Dodgers to take on a quarter of a billion dollars in guaranteed contracts in exchange for the Dodgers' top two pitching prospects, the upper levels of the minor leagues are jammed with potential impact arms. Matt Barnes, a 2011 draftee, and Rubby de la Rosa and Allen Webster, the aforementioned Dodgers' prospects, all could be ready to contribute to the majors in the next year. Two college pitchers, Brian Johnson, a low ceiling, high floor lefty out of Florida, and Brandon Workman, a big righty with a great fastball and not much else, could also be contributing in the next few years, whether it is in the back end of the rotation or the bullpen.

The Worst Team of the Century

Note: After putting this list together, Fangraphs and Baseball Reference both changed their replacement level calculations, so that they now match. Of course, this also means that these numbers no longer match what is available on either website.While the exact WAR values have changed, these players are still the worst at their positions since the year 2000.

My previous post on Jose Iglesias, where I discovered that Neifi Perez had the worst year out of any player in the last 20 years has inspired me to put together the worst lineup possible, going back to 2000. For all positions, I used a minimum of 400 plate appearances, but this only affected a couple of the players. Generally speaking, if you're at the most negative extreme of production, you needed a lot of at bats to do it.

Catcher - Michael Barrett, Expos, 2001, -0.8 WAR
Catcher actually does fairly well compared to the other positions, perhaps because few catchers get to 400 plate appearances if they are terrible and the fact that most teams carry two or three that they use in a regular rotation. In 2001, 24 year old Michael Barrett put up a .250/.289/.367 line for the now defunct Montreal Expos. While this was only slightly worse than the positional average, he also gave back 13 runs on defense. Despite posting a -1.7 and -0.8 WAR in consecutive years, Barrett continued to develop and became a solid catcher for the Cubs, averaging 2.8 WAR for the Cubs in 2004-2006. Unfortunately, Barrett suffered a concussion in 2007 with the Padres, followed by another one and broken facial bones on a foul tip in 2008. These, and a shoulder injury, effectively ended his career as a major leaguer.

1B - Aubrey Huff, Orioles and Tigers, 2009, -1.8 WAR
Coming in to 2009, Aubrey Huff was arguably one of the more underrated hitters in baseball. Toiling away on poor Baltimore and Tampa Bay teams, Huff had two four win seasons and another 3.3 win season. Fresh off a 32 home run, 4.0 WAR season in 2008, Huff fell apart. In the year 2009 the ERA of the pitcher was about to dawn, but first basemen were still real first basemen, corner outfielders were still real corner outfielders, and small, furry creatures from Alpha Centauri were still real small, furry creatures from Alpha Centauri. Huff's strikeout and walk rates stayed the same, but his BABIP dropped 50 points and his isolated power dropped 100 points. Not a winning combination. Huff managed to bounce back in 2010, putting up the best season of his career and was the best hitter on the World Champion the Giants. Huff turned his career year into one last lucrative contract, resigning with the Giants for two years and $22 million, but was a below replacement player in both 2011 and 2012.

2B - Mike Lansing, Rockies and Red Sox, 2000, -1.5 WAR
Our first Red Sox player on the list. In 1997, Lansing was a 4 win player, but followed up that season with a 0.4 WAR season in 1998 and an injury plagued 0.0 WAR season in 1999. Unfortunately, things got worse in 2000 with more playing time. Lansing struggled with the Rockies and was traded to the Red Sox and put up a combined .240/.292/.365 line in a highly charged offensive era. Lansing was an average defender, but his terrible batting line led to his terrible overall performance. For whatever reason, the Red Sox kept him on in 2001, giving him 382 plate appearances and allowing him to put up another negative WAR season. Lansing attempted a comeback with the Indians in 2002, but it was derailed by a back injury in the minors.

3B - Pedro Feliz, Astros and Cardinals, 2010, -1.9 WAR
Feliz was a solid second division starter throughout most of his career for the Giants and the Phillies, before signing a one year, $4 million deal with the Houston Astros. A common recipe for appearing on this list, Feliz has a good glove and not much of a bat. In 2010, Feliz' defense got markedly worse, being below average for the first time in his career, while also putting up his worst hitting season. His typically low walk rate dropped to an abysmal 3%, while he was also unlucky on balls in play, with only a .228 BABIP. After hitting for a .554 OPS for the Astros in the first half of the season, he was traded for cash, a low level prospect, and the right not to have to pay him any more to the Cardinals. Unfortunately for the Cardinals, he managed a .482 OPS in 120 at bats. Feliz signed a minor league deal with the Royals in 2011, but didn't make it out of spring training.

SS - Neifi Perez, Royals, 2002, -2.9 WAR
Neifi Perez is the proud owner of the worst overall WAR of the last 20 years. Perez never had an above average season with the bat, but solid defense and playing a middle infield position was enough for him to post seasons where he was above replacement. Unfortunately, that all went to hell in 2002, his first full season with the Royals following a midseason trade in which the Royals shipped out Jermaine Dye. Perez had his worst full season with the bat, having career lows in average, OBP, slugging, isolated power, and was an astounding 61% worse than average and coupled it with a glove that was -13 runs. Perez was hurt by a low average on balls in play, but he really wasn't helping himself, either. Perez managed to play for five more years and managed to recover in 2003 to put up a 1.1 WAR for the Giants.

RF - Brennan Boesch, Tigers, 2012,  -1.3 WAR
Brennan Boesch appeared to be on the verge of a breakout coming in to 2012. In part time play he put up 16 home runs and contributed 1.7 WAR for the Tigers, and was expected to be the Tigers starting right fielder. Full time play did not work out well for Boesch, as he stumbled badly putting up a .240/.286/.372 line. His walk rate dropped, his strikeout rate rose, and his power dropped. To top it all off, Boesch was worth -12 runs in the field. Boesch will have a chance to rebound in a more friendly environment in new Yankee Stadium. As a left handed pull hitter (10 of his 12 home runs were hit to right field), Boesch should benefit from the short porch in right, much like Ichiro did in his half a season in New York.

CF - Bernie Williams, Yankees, 2005, -2.2 WAR
Following the 2006 season I remember the Yankees not resigning Bernie Williams, and I wondered how that happened. He was Bernie Williams! Their best center fielder since Mickey Mantle. Well, now that I know the numbers a bit better, it makes a lot more sense, Bernie Williams just wasn't Bernie Williams any longer.  From 1995 to 2002 Bernie Williams was the best and most consistent center fielder in baseball, averaging 5.1 WAR per season, and only once dropping below 4.9 WAR (4.2 in 1996). By the tail end of that stretch his glove didn't really play in center any longer, but his well above average bat still did. In 2003 and 2004 Williams put up slightly above average hitting numbers, but was barely above replacement thanks to his poor defense. In 2005, it all fell apart, though. His play in center field cost the Yankees 29.3 runs, and hit offensive line was below average too. He hit .249/.321/.367 when the league average hitter was hitting .264/.330/.419. Williams "bounced back" in 2006 to a -1.2 WAR, but most of that was through fielding that was bad, instead of historically bad. After the Yankees showed no interest in resigning Williams, he retired from baseball at the age of 38.

LF - Raul Ibanez, Phillies, 2011, -1.3 WAR
In December 2008 the Phillies signed Raul Ibanez to a three year, $30 million contract that was universally derided by analysts. After all, Ibanez was about to turn 37 and had been an ok, but not great outfielder for the Mariners. Ibanez responded to the deal by putting up the best season of his career, setting career highs in home runs (34) and slugging percentage. Unfortunately for the Phillies and Ibanez, multi-year deals are not evaluated on their first year alone. Ibanez returned to his more normal production in in 2010,  and fell of a cliff in 2011, in part thanks to a massive decline in his walk rate, and terrible fielding, as measured by UZR. It was awfully bad timing for Ibanez, who was hitting the free agent market again. He landed as a bench bat on the Yankees and made good use of platoon splits, the short porch in right field, and avoiding wearing a glove as much as humanly possible to bounce back to a 1.1 WAR season. Ibanez is now a Mariner, after signing a one year, $2.75 deal, but will likely find Safeco Field much less forgiving.

DH - Adam Dunn, White Sox, 2011, -3.0 WAR
From 2004 to 2010 Adam Dunn was as consistent a power source you could possibly imagine. In fact, he hit exactly 40 home runs from 2005 to 2008, then followed that up with consecutive years with 38 home runs. He was a three true outcomes player - lots of walks, strike outs, and home runs. When the White Sox signed him to a four year, $56 million deal they thought they were getting that consistent power and shifting him to first base and designated hitter from the outfield would minimize remove most unfortunate side effects of him playing the field (-128 runs of fielding "value" for his career). Unfortunately for the White Sox, Dunn went from a three true outcome player to a two true outcome player. His strikeout rate skyrocketed to a career high 35.7% , his isolated power (slugging minus batting average) dropped from an elite .276 to .118. Dunn fell just short of qualifying for the batting title in 2011, but his .118 ISO would have ranked 121st, out of 145 qualifiers and behind such power hitters as Coco Crisp, Yunel Escobar, and Erik Aybar. Despite his spectuacularly bad season, Dunn bounced back in 2012, hitting 41 home runs. The power was nice, but his average was still .204. Despite the return to form home run wise, Dunn's strikeout rate lingered in the mid-30s. If that rate climbs at all, Dunn could return to being a non-factor offensively, even if he hits 40 home runs.

All told, this team provides a combined -15 WAR. Since we'd expect a replacement level team to have a .320 win percentage, or 52 wins over the course of a season (per Baseball Reference), this team would expect to win 37 games, good for a 22.8% win percentage. While this team would be worse than the 1962 Mets, the worst team in the modern era, they would escape the ignominy of being the worst team ever as the 1899 Cleveland Spiders won an astounding 13% of their games (20-134).

Just how badly would Jose Iglesias have to hit in order to be below average?

With Stephen Drew slow to return from a concussion and without a clear time table, as if often the case with concussions, just ask Justin Morneau, the Red Sox are considering Jose Iglesias at short to begin the season. It all depends on his contribution with the other aspects of his game, so let's see if we can get some rough estimates there. A quick reminder - I'll be discussing value in terms of runs here, but at the end we'll discuss it in terms of wins. The quick and dirty conversion from runs to wins, whether they're runs saved defensively or runs scored offensively, is one win equals 10 runs.

Everyone considers Iglesias the best defender in the minors, and the advanced metrics for his career put him at saving an astounding 41 runs over the course of a full season. Granted, these metrics take much longer than one month to stabilize and this would have put Iglesias as twice as good a defender as anyone else in baseball, but the advanced metrics support the assertion that Iglesias is an elite defender. Last year the best defenders saved just over 20 runs, and since 1950 40 different shortstops have had seasons where they saved 20 or more runs, led by Mark Belanger's 1975 when he saved 33 runs. Given Iglesias' defensive pedigree and universal defensive acclaim, I think 20 runs over the course of a full season is reasonable, and this could be a fairly conservative estimate.

Iglesias is fairly fast, but does not have blazing speed. He seems to have good base running instincts, but does not run very often (12 SB, 3 CS in 400 PA in AAA last year, 75% success rate for his career in the minors). As far as comparables, Rafael Furcal (the current version, not the 46 steal version from 2005) who stole 12 bases and was caught 4 times seems like a good fit. In 2012, Furcal was worth 2.5 runs on the bases. This value includes other aspects of base running, such as advancing on hits, but for simplicity's sake, we'll pick our comparable using stolen base numbers.

Finally, we get to the last numbers on the positive side of the ledger. First of all, Fangraphs defines "replacement level" as -20 runs per 600 plate appearances, so we get to add 20 runs to Iglesias' total. Also, shortstop is an extremely thin position. It has been said over and over again, but the golden age of shortstops is long past us. The average shortstop hit .256/.310/.375 in 2012, so the bar is rather low for Iglesias. That level of league wide production puts the positional adjustment at 7 runs. This means that just by playing shortstop, Iglesias get a bonus of 7 runs over a position like third base, where hitters were about league average, or even more for a position like first base or a corner outfield spot where hitters are penalized for their position, given the expectation that they hit above league average just to be average for their position. So, just for playing shortstop in the majors, Iglesias gets +27 runs to his overall numbers.


So up to this point, we have Jose Iglesias being a 50 run, or five win player, in 2012 if he can just manage to have no negative value as a hitter. For example, Alcides Escobar's 2012 batting line of .293/.331/.390 was worth exactly zero point zero runs. Unfortunately, Iglesias is extremely unlikely to match that kind of production, having hit only .266/.318/.306 in AAA last year. But, in order to have positive value for the Red Sox, he'd only need to be better than -50 runs. According to Fangraph's calculations, Drew Stubbs (-20) was the worst hitter in the league last year. Negative thirty runs is awfully hard to come by, but a nice comparable might be Cezar Izturis' 2010*. Given 500 plate appearances, Izturis hit an incredible .230/.277/.268. Those numbers actually match Igelsias' AAA numbers nicely, adjusting them to the better competition in the majors (.229/.272/.263). Iglesias does have youth on his side, though. He is only 23 and has plenty of room to grow, and this spring training he has six extra base hits in 46 at bats, compared to 11 in 353 at bats in AAA last year.

* The worst batting line of the last 20 years comes courtesy of the Royals, who rolled out Neifi Perez's .236/.260/.303 line for almost 600 plate appearances, good for a mind boggling -42 runs. Sadly, his fielding wasn't doing him any favors either, at -13 runs. This all led to Perez putting up the worst season in the last 20 years at 2.9 wins BELOW replacement and negative eight million dollars worth of performance , and after he was the centerpiece the Royals received after trading away Jermaine Dye to get him. Somehow the Royals managed to foist him and his $4 million salary off on the Giants, where he rebounded to a 1.1 win season, thanks in large part to a return to form defensively.

Overall, this analysis backs up the general assertions that if the Red Sox put Iglesias in the lineup right now, he'd be a two win player. Whether or not that will stunt his development as a hitter or if his failings on offense will affect his focus on defense is an entirely different set of questions. Concussions are tricky injuries and Drew's may linger over the course of the season; if that does happen, the Red Sox may be in the tricky position of balancing using the best shortstop they have on the roster at the expense allowing that player to continue to develop in the minor leagues.

Scott Kazmir is back!

In today's Cleveland-Milwaukee game, he pitched a pretty magical two innings. Let's take a quick look at the box score: 2 IP, 1H 0BB, 1K 0ER Pretty good, but it is spring training. Nothing to get too excited about, unless you keep reading and see this: Pitches-strikes: Carrasco 14-9, Kazmir 9-9, Bauer 7-7, Rogers 21-6, Leon, Ar 15-6, Jungmann 19-6, Hoey 0-0. NINE pitches, all for strikes, including a strikeout! In case you are curious, here's the play by play: Jeff Bianchi grounds out on first pitch, one out. Norichika Aoki flies out on first pitch, two outs. Logan Shafer doubles on first pitch. Alex Gonzalez strikes out in three pitches, all swinging. Aramiz Ramirez grounds out, Taylor Green flies out, Robinzon Diaz grounds, each on the first pitch. Hitters swung at EVERY SINGLE PITCH Kazmir threw, even though he spent the last two years rehabbing or in the Independent League, struggling with his control. Spring training is amazing.

Would you trade Jon Lester for Wil Myers?

According to Bob Dutton, of the Kansas City Star, my completely made up rumor has legs and the Royals are considering Jon Lester in exchange for Wil Myers.

The Kansas City Royals are currently looking for frontline starting pitching, and are supposedly dangling consensus #1 overall prospect Wil Myers.  Myers is coming off of a season where he hit .304/.378/.504 with 37 home runs between double and triple A.  He also won nearly every possible award for a minor league hitter, despite being young for the level.  If I had to pick one player in the minors to make an impact on the 2013 season, it would be Myers.

Lester, on the other hand, is only under contract for one year at $11.6 million, followed by a $14 million option.  During both of these years, the Red Sox are likely to be rebuilding, waiting for the crushing of your talent to arrive in the majors, led by Boegarts, Bradley, and Barnes.  Lester has been in a slow and steady decline from his spectacular 2009, as well.  Much of this may be tied to his declining velocity - he's lost a full mile per hour off his four seam fastball since 2009, but he has also moved away from his cut fastball, throwing it only 13% of the time in 2012, compared to 25% in 2011.  The reason why seems quite clear - it just wasn't getting the job done.  In 2009 and 2010 Lester's cutter was a devastating weapon, and was easily his best pitch.  In 2011 the cutter was still his best pitch, but not as effective as the previous two years, and by 2012 his cutter was below average and his worst pitch overall.  Just how exactly did Lester go from being the starter with the second best cutter in baseball to one that was well below average?

In examining the PITCHf/x data that is available from Baseball Prospectus (courtesy of Brooks Baseball), a few things jumped out at me.  First, he isn't tipping his pitches with his release point - the cutter and four seam fastball are coming out of the same window in 2010 and 2012, his best and worst year with the cutter.  What has shrunk considerably is the difference in velocity.  Just like with a changeup, a bigger difference in velocity produces better results for a cutter.  In 2010 Lester threw a 94 mile an hour fastball and a 90 mile per hour cutter, but in 2012 his fastball velocity had decline to 93.5 mph and his cutter had risen to 91 mph.  That shrinking velocity gap is worrisome, but more worrisome is the loss of movement on the pitch.  Between 2010 and 2012 Lester has lost 1" of horizontal movement and 2" of vertical movement differential between his cutter and four seam fastball.  This loss of movement and velocity differential has led to an elevated home run per fly ball rate for the cutter, rising from a miniscule 2.3% in 2010 to 11.3%.

The million (multi-million really) dollar question is what is at the root of this change?  If you think it is something fixable, then the Red Sox should probably just hang on to Lester.  Unfortunately, there isn't anything in the numbers that jumps out as an easy fix, such as an inconsistent release point.  If the Royals are dead set on trading for a frontline starter, and Myers is on the table, then the Red Sox need to be talking to them.  Given that Lester is coming off a down year, he might not even be enough for Myers, but former top prospect Eric Hosmer is coming off of a down year and could be an intriguing fit for the Red Sox, who have a massive hole to fill at first base for the next five years.  The Red Sox probably don't want to give the impression that they're blowing the team up, but the opportunity to add a young, impact hitter should have Cherington pondering just how much of a PR hit he's willing to take for the long term outlook of the franchise.

What is Dan Haren worth?

Depending on who you want to use, Dan Haren was either a 1.8 win pitcher last year, or a -0.6 win pitcher.  The difference stems from Fangraphs  using a pitcher's expected, fielding independent ERA (FIP), while Baseball Reference uses their actual ERA.  Either way, if you're trading for Dan Haren and paying him $15.5 million, you're not using 2012 as your point of reference.  Coming into the season, Haren had been about as consistent as a pitcher can be, posting four win seasons since 2005, including three seasons of six plus wins above replacement in the four seasons from 2008 - 2011.  Injuries derailed his season, but given that he's effectively on a one year deal, he's an intriguing option.

Looking to the recently completed Ervin Santana trade, the Angels may not be looking for much in return for Haren.  Sisk, the relief pitcher acquired in the Santana deal, tops out as a lefty one out guy, and even as such, may not even sniff the majors.  They'd likely want more for Haren, but the Red Sox happen to have an abundance of what the Angels need - relief arms.  After a core of Frieri, Downs, Walden, and Jepsen, the Angels relievers were pretty rough, leading to a team reliever ERA of 3.97, good for 12th in the American League.  Although the Red Sox were 11th in the league, they do have spectacular relief depth.  Alfredo Aceves could be a good match - he obviously needs a change of scenery following the repeated issues in Boston last year, and the Angels could use him as a swingman.  With an exodus of starting pitchers, including potentially losing Zach Grienke as a free agent, and a reliance on young arms, the Angels could be very thin in their rotation, so Aceves could slot in there.  Alternatively, if their pitchers resign and stay healthy, Aceves could be a multi-inning reliever from their bullpen.  Despite Aceves having a projected salary of $2.6 million after arbitration, the Angels would actually save money by trading away Haren, since he has a $3.5 million buyout on his option year.  The Angels may not want Aceves, given his discipline issues in both Boston and New York, but even still the Red Sox have a plethora of arms that are fairly fungible, such as Rich Hill, Scott Atchison (who would be under team control for another four years), or Theo Epstein's "replacement", Scott Carpenter.

Edwin Jackson, baseball vagabond

Edwin Jackson has had one of the more interesting baseball careers.  Given how many different teams he's played for in his 12 parts of seasons in the majors, he might choose a different adjective, though.

In the early to middle 2000s, Jackson was one of the best pitching prospects in baseball, topping out as Baseball America's #4 prospect in 2004, and was in the top 100 2003-2005.  He debuted as a 19 year old for the Dodgers in 2003, but never managed to crack their rotation in his other two seasons there, never accumulating 30 innings.  Thanks to an impressive amount of roster mismanagement, burning options in those years, the Dodgers needed to either put Jackson on their major league roster or lose him to waivers.  Instead, the Dodgers traded him for two mediocre relievers, Danys Baez and Lance Carter, and Jackson found himself headed to the Tampa Bay Devil Rays, who were still a baseball laughing stock.