This game marked the return of Eduardo Rodriguez to the mound, with E-Rod pitching for the Red Sox for the first time since September 29, 2019. Rodriguez was slated to pitch on opening day, though the start of his season was delayed due to a “dead arm.” 2019 was a huge let down after the 2018 World Series Champion team, with the Red Sox finishing 19 games behind the Yankees for the AL East and 12 games behind the Rays for the second wild card spot, but Rodriguez was undoubtedly a highlight for the season. He shouldered a full load, making 34 starts and throwing over 200 innings for a rotation that lost Chris Sale and Nathan Eovaldi for huge chunks of the year.
Eduardo Rodriguez pitched fairly well in his return to the mound, striking out seven while walking no one in five innings. He did give up three runs, all via the long ball, leaving his overall line a bit less impressive than some of the underlying numbers. Despite the 3 runs and the shorter outing (unsurprising, given that he’s coming off the dead arm), there are some positives to be found in the box score. On a per pitch basis, Rodriguez seemed sharp on the whole, throwing 56 of his 790 pitches for strikes (71%) and inducing 10 swinging strikes (12.6%). In general, he got ahead of hitters, with 13/20 getting first pitch strikes. His line of 7 strikeouts and no walks inspires some confidence that 2019 Rodriguez is back, even if the two home runs in only five innings pitched puts a damper on things a little bit. The first inning home run to Mountcastle was a tough one to give up; ahead 0-2, Rodriguez left a fastball over the plate in the upper portion of the strike zone. Mountcastle took advantage of that mistake and lashed a line drive home run to the power alley in right field to tie the score at 2 after an early Red Sox lead. Rodriguez also gave up a home run to Severino on a first pitch middle-middle fastball that Severino sent to the right field seats. Rodriguez was sitting around his 2019 velocity, but the location certainly left something to be desired.
Rodriguez threw his last pitch with a 3-2 deficit, courtesy of the aforementioned home runs. However, by the bottom of the sixth came, that score had flipped to a 4-3 lead. The Sox turned to Rule 5 pickup Garrett Whitlock to try and hang on to the lead, and he delivered. Whitlock, who was acquired from the Yankees for a small amount of cash ($100,000, so small by major league baseball standards), but has to stay on the MLB roster for the Red Sox to keep him, has certainly looked the part of a major league pitcher, despite never throwing above AA and spending 2020 recovering from Tommy John surgery. Because of his lack of experience and injury history, the Yankees left him off of the 40 man roster ahead of the Rule 5 draft, and he was snapped up by the pitching hungry Red Sox with the 4th pick of the Rule 5 draft for $100,000. Whitlock threw well in the blowout loss to cap off the Orioles sweep , throwing 3 1/3 innings with 5 strikeouts and three hits. But coming into a close game is an entirely different matter, especially for a Rule 5 pick that is essentially stashed on the roster. Whitlock pitched exceptionally well, throwing 2 perfect innings with 3 strikeouts. Of his 20 pitches, only five were balls and he induced 5 swinging and 4 called strikes. Whitlock certainly looks the part of a major league pitcher, at 6’5” and 190 lbs and has the stuff to match (95 MPH fastball, slider, and a developing changeup), though durability will certainly be a concern. Right now, he looks like an absolute steal in the Rule 5 draft, and could potentially even slide into the rotation in the second half of the season. He allowed the Red Sox to bridge to the back end of the bullpen, and showed some killer stuff.
Following Whitlock, Matt Andriese pitched the 8th inning. Andriese has been a guy throughout his career, posting about league average stats in a variety of roles. Andriese worked around a walk and a hit in the 8th, but nothing from his box score particularly jumps out.
Matt Barnes slammed the door on the Orioles this game, even if it was not a save situation. Barnes struck out Maikel Franco and Pedro Severino (who victimized E-Rod earlier in the game) on six pitches. In fact, he was one pitch away from an immaculate inning (9 pitches, 3 strikeouts) before Freddy Galvis fouled off an 0-2 curveball. Barnes got him in the end, striking him out on a 1-2 curve. All told, Barnes threw 11 pitches, 10 for strikes, and induced 3 swinging strikes. In short, he was dominant. It wasn’t quite an immaculate inning, but striking out the side on 11 pitches is pretty damn good as well.
Thursday, April 8, 2021
Monday, April 5, 2021
One game, one team: Toronto Blue Jays 4/1/2021
I am trying to get back into writing a little bit about baseball. With these shorter pieces, I will focus on tidbits from box scores and highlights for one team in one specific game. Hopefully I'll be able to do some larger pieces later in the season once the semester is over.
On Opening Day, the Blue Jays eeked out a one run win over the Yankees in ten innings. They had a few close calls before pulling it out. The ace of the staff last year, Hyun-Jin Ryu was tapped for the first start, and Ryu struggled with first pitches, only getting ahead of 7 of the 21 batters he faced. Twelve swinging strikes is nice (13%), but he’ll need better control in order to maintain his success from the last couple of years. In 2020, his walk rate ticked up to 6.2%, which is about the same as his career numbers (5.5%), but well above the very successful years he had with the Dodgers (4.6% in 2018, 3.3% in 2019). While he only walked one batter this start, the
Dolis pitched the 8th inning, showing no issues stemming from the back spasms that caused him to miss a bit of time towards the end of spring training. Dolis assumed the traditional setup man role for this game, pitching the 8th with the score tied at 2. He was slated to face the 3-4-5 hitters (Hicks, Stanton, Torres) so the Blue Jays may be focusing on having him face the top hitters. Unsurprisingly, this closer situation will need monitoring, as Dolis could very well have pitched the 9th if the batting order in the late innings was just a bit different.
Jordan Romero was nearly unhittable, both because he was not throwing strikes (10/22 pitches), but also because of filthy stuff (8 swinging strikes, 36%). Last year Romero had an elite combination of high swinging strike rates (19.4%) and getting ahead of hitters (66.7% first pitch strike rate), which led him to be the top AL reliever per my modeled, based on xK and xBB rates. Only LeMahieu managed to make contact against him, with a weak groundball to third base. Granted, because of two earlier walks and a stolen base, Biggio had to make a nice throw to the plate to get the second out of the inning and prevent Tauchman’s potentially winning run from scoring, but some flashes of dominance from Romero. To end the 9th, Judge struck out on a fastball which seemed to catch him off guard, leaving the winning run at second base. Judge swung late and underneath the ball, perhaps sitting on Romano’s slider, which was his best pitch in 2020.
Merryweather was even more impressive, looking absolutely dominant to close the game out in the 10th. It only took him 11 pitches to strike out the side, and he only threw one single ball. Merryweather is an older (29) starting pitching prospect who is penciled in for the swingman role in the Blue Jays bullpen. He could emerge as an old school, multi-inning fireman. His fastball was already impressive in 2020, averaging 96.7 MPH, but in this outing it was nearly two MPH faster (98.4). Obviously a tiny sample size, but the velocity on his fastball and slider are both up about 2 MPH, while also dropping his changeup velocity. If you are in a league where middle relievers have value, he could be an excellent pickup. Since writing an initial draft of this post, Merryweather picked up another save on Sunday. He was similarly dominant, striking out 2 Yankees in a perfect inning to close out a 3-1 win. Merryweather has been nearly unhittable thus far, and could be stealing the closer job from Dolis or Romano (who pitched in the 8th on Sunday).
On Opening Day, the Blue Jays eeked out a one run win over the Yankees in ten innings. They had a few close calls before pulling it out. The ace of the staff last year, Hyun-Jin Ryu was tapped for the first start, and Ryu struggled with first pitches, only getting ahead of 7 of the 21 batters he faced. Twelve swinging strikes is nice (13%), but he’ll need better control in order to maintain his success from the last couple of years. In 2020, his walk rate ticked up to 6.2%, which is about the same as his career numbers (5.5%), but well above the very successful years he had with the Dodgers (4.6% in 2018, 3.3% in 2019). While he only walked one batter this start, the
Dolis pitched the 8th inning, showing no issues stemming from the back spasms that caused him to miss a bit of time towards the end of spring training. Dolis assumed the traditional setup man role for this game, pitching the 8th with the score tied at 2. He was slated to face the 3-4-5 hitters (Hicks, Stanton, Torres) so the Blue Jays may be focusing on having him face the top hitters. Unsurprisingly, this closer situation will need monitoring, as Dolis could very well have pitched the 9th if the batting order in the late innings was just a bit different.
Jordan Romero was nearly unhittable, both because he was not throwing strikes (10/22 pitches), but also because of filthy stuff (8 swinging strikes, 36%). Last year Romero had an elite combination of high swinging strike rates (19.4%) and getting ahead of hitters (66.7% first pitch strike rate), which led him to be the top AL reliever per my modeled, based on xK and xBB rates. Only LeMahieu managed to make contact against him, with a weak groundball to third base. Granted, because of two earlier walks and a stolen base, Biggio had to make a nice throw to the plate to get the second out of the inning and prevent Tauchman’s potentially winning run from scoring, but some flashes of dominance from Romero. To end the 9th, Judge struck out on a fastball which seemed to catch him off guard, leaving the winning run at second base. Judge swung late and underneath the ball, perhaps sitting on Romano’s slider, which was his best pitch in 2020.
Merryweather was even more impressive, looking absolutely dominant to close the game out in the 10th. It only took him 11 pitches to strike out the side, and he only threw one single ball. Merryweather is an older (29) starting pitching prospect who is penciled in for the swingman role in the Blue Jays bullpen. He could emerge as an old school, multi-inning fireman. His fastball was already impressive in 2020, averaging 96.7 MPH, but in this outing it was nearly two MPH faster (98.4). Obviously a tiny sample size, but the velocity on his fastball and slider are both up about 2 MPH, while also dropping his changeup velocity. If you are in a league where middle relievers have value, he could be an excellent pickup. Since writing an initial draft of this post, Merryweather picked up another save on Sunday. He was similarly dominant, striking out 2 Yankees in a perfect inning to close out a 3-1 win. Merryweather has been nearly unhittable thus far, and could be stealing the closer job from Dolis or Romano (who pitched in the 8th on Sunday).
Wednesday, May 7, 2014
A star lefty, in decline
Over the last three years, including thus far in the 2014 season, this highly touted ace has seen his ERA rise almost a full earned run between both 2012 and 2013, and 2013 and 2014, and is now solidly below average. He's been victimized by a decline in ground balls (53% in 2012 to 42.6 in 2014) and a lot more fly balls leaving the park (15.7% in 2014, compared to a 9.4% on his career).
On baseball fandom, modern society, and poverty
This is a rather random observation, starting with a spectacular infographic from the New York Times which mined Facebook information to map out which places root for which baseball teams.Seriously, go play around with that map. Right now.
Not to get overly dramatic, but the map of baseball fandom can really lead to some conclusions about America as a whole. Before we start wildly speculating, an important caveat for this map. The percentages are calculated based on how often baseball teams are being mentioned in a Facebook post. It does not look at overall levels of support for baseball compared to other sports or activities, so those percentages should be read as numbers specific to posts regarding baseball.
First, the west is settled by transplants, who are taking their previous allegiances with them. People living close to west coast teams at 50-60% support in their highest counties, whereas east coast teams like the Red Sox, Yankees, Braves, and Phillies are in the 70-80%. This isn't surprising; people aren't moving to Boston from California too terribly often, at least in comparison to migrants in the other direction.
The Halo Effect
Additionally, we can see some interesting effects surrounding major cities, such as Boston. I've only shown Boston as an example, but similar patterns surround St. Louis and Philadelphia. What we can see is that the areas surrounding the city actually have higher support for the local team than the city itself. If folks from elsewhere in the country are moving to these areas (and bringing their baseball allegiance with them), they're more likely to move into the major metropolitan areas, rather than the suburbs. So what we see is a halo of higher local team support surrounding the city center.
Not all cities follow this pattern though. Take Detroit, for example. Instead of having a lower level of support in the city center, we see a halo of lower support surrounding the city center, which has higher support than the surrounding suburbs. We can use the level of support for the local team as a proxy for the amount of people moving into the area from other parts of the country. So in Boston, if you're moving into the area, you're staying close to the city, but if you're in Detroit, you're moving into the suburbs north and west of the city. This difference shouldn't be too surprising, as Detroit is a classic example of white flight from a major metropolitan area.
Local Support and Poverty
We can see in Detroit a higher poverty level in the core city center, compared to the surrounding suburbs. This is a pattern you see in almost every city in the US, but it is particularly marked in Detroit. I think the implications are simple - if an area has a very high poverty level, new transplants to the city are less likely to move there, which in turn will maintain higher levels of support for the local team.
This pattern also holds true in western cities, such as Los Angeles. It shouldn't be too surprising that we see higher poverty rates in city centers - this is a pattern that holds true in all cities across the country, even in very high income cities like San Francisco. However, the association between poverty and home team support seems to be more marked in poorer cities overall.
If you'd like to look at poverty rates in the US, here is another nice infographic from the New York Times.
Not to get overly dramatic, but the map of baseball fandom can really lead to some conclusions about America as a whole. Before we start wildly speculating, an important caveat for this map. The percentages are calculated based on how often baseball teams are being mentioned in a Facebook post. It does not look at overall levels of support for baseball compared to other sports or activities, so those percentages should be read as numbers specific to posts regarding baseball.
First, the west is settled by transplants, who are taking their previous allegiances with them. People living close to west coast teams at 50-60% support in their highest counties, whereas east coast teams like the Red Sox, Yankees, Braves, and Phillies are in the 70-80%. This isn't surprising; people aren't moving to Boston from California too terribly often, at least in comparison to migrants in the other direction.
The Halo Effect
 | |
| Red Sox support surrounding Boston (darker=higher) |
 |
| Tigers support surrounding Detroit (darker=higher) |
Local Support and PovertyWe can see in Detroit a higher poverty level in the core city center, compared to the surrounding suburbs. This is a pattern you see in almost every city in the US, but it is particularly marked in Detroit. I think the implications are simple - if an area has a very high poverty level, new transplants to the city are less likely to move there, which in turn will maintain higher levels of support for the local team.
This pattern also holds true in western cities, such as Los Angeles. It shouldn't be too surprising that we see higher poverty rates in city centers - this is a pattern that holds true in all cities across the country, even in very high income cities like San Francisco. However, the association between poverty and home team support seems to be more marked in poorer cities overall.
If you'd like to look at poverty rates in the US, here is another nice infographic from the New York Times.
Monday, February 24, 2014
Are qualifying offers broken or are free agents miscalculating their own value?
Nelson Cruz recently signed a one year, $8 million deal with the Orioles, Ubaldo Jimenez had to wait for ages to sign his 4 year, $50 million deal, and Stephen Drew and Ervin Santana remain unsigned. This has led to some claims that the qualifying offer system is broken, and the head of the players union, Tony Clark, is concerned about the system. The new system has teams extend a one year offer based on the highest salary for the top 125 players. The player can accept the one year deal, about $14 million, or decline it. If a different team signs that player, they forfeit their top draft pick, with the top 10 picks being protected. This new system has hurt some players, particularly ones who are not true stars.
Monday, February 17, 2014
Saving the Dempster money for a big splash?
The Red Sox have many options on how to spend the windfall, but the best one that comes to mind is acquiring Cliff Lee from the Phillies at some point this season. Acquiring Lee at midseason would use up the $13.25 million freed up by the Dempster semi-retirement. Thanks to the large amount of cap room, it wouldn't preclude other acquisitions as well. It would also give the Red Sox a true ace for the next 2.5 years that Lee would be under contract.
Despite their massive payroll ($170 million, 3rd highest in baseball), the Phillies are not expected to contend - ESPN ranked them as the second worst team in baseball. From the Phillies' perspective, dealing Lee would give them a great deal of additional financial flexibility in the next few years and would get them under the luxury tax threshold. The Lee's contract is one of the only large ones the Phillies could really move. The ink is still drying on the recent extensions to Cole Hamels and Chase Utley, and the deals to Ryan Howard and Jonathon Papelbon are pretty much unmoveable - Howard's contract was ranked at the third worst in the majors last season. Lee's contract is really the team could trade while acquiring real prospects.
Despite their massive payroll ($170 million, 3rd highest in baseball), the Phillies are not expected to contend - ESPN ranked them as the second worst team in baseball. From the Phillies' perspective, dealing Lee would give them a great deal of additional financial flexibility in the next few years and would get them under the luxury tax threshold. The Lee's contract is one of the only large ones the Phillies could really move. The ink is still drying on the recent extensions to Cole Hamels and Chase Utley, and the deals to Ryan Howard and Jonathon Papelbon are pretty much unmoveable - Howard's contract was ranked at the third worst in the majors last season. Lee's contract is really the team could trade while acquiring real prospects.
Sunday, February 16, 2014
Dempster decision simultaneously clarifies 2014, and opens up possibilities
Almost out of nowhere, Ryan Dempster has decided not to play this season. He stopped short of an official retirement, but coming off one of the worst seasons of his career and a lingering neck injury, it wouldn't be shocking if he didn't pitch again in the majors.
The move takes away the Red Sox pitching depth - prior to the decision Dempster was one of six pitchers competing for a spot in the starting rotation, with the 5th spot probably down to Dempster and Doubront. Now, the Red Sox starting 5 is set, and they still have good depth in the high minors with Brandon Workman, Allen Webster, and Rubby de la Rosa. This move probably impacts Workman more than anyone, given his success in the majors last year, both as a starter and a high leverage reliever. Now, he would be the first to step in to the rotation in case of injury or ineffectiveness (at least from Doubront), and the path to him staying a starting pitcher is much clearer. It also means he'll likely stay in the minors to start the season.
This also gives the Red Sox some substantial financial wiggle room. According to Scott Lauber, of the Boston Herald, the Red Sox had about $7 million of salary room before they'd hit the luxury cap threshold. If Ryan Dempster were placed on the restricted list, likely given his decision not to pitch this year, the Red Sox wouldn't be responsible for his $13.25 million salary, nor would it count against the luxury tax threshold. Now, the Red Sox have about $20 million to play with, allowing them to either resign Stephen Drew or give them the flexibility to make multiple major in-season acquisitions without surpassing the threshold.
Finally, best of luck to Ryan Dempster in his future endeavors. At 36 and dealing with nagging injuries, it is completely understandable that he is ready to put his family first. It is also remarkable that he is willing to give up $13 million because he doesn't think he can do an acceptable job pitching this year. He's already made almost $90 million in his career, so hopefully his family will be set for generations to come.
The move takes away the Red Sox pitching depth - prior to the decision Dempster was one of six pitchers competing for a spot in the starting rotation, with the 5th spot probably down to Dempster and Doubront. Now, the Red Sox starting 5 is set, and they still have good depth in the high minors with Brandon Workman, Allen Webster, and Rubby de la Rosa. This move probably impacts Workman more than anyone, given his success in the majors last year, both as a starter and a high leverage reliever. Now, he would be the first to step in to the rotation in case of injury or ineffectiveness (at least from Doubront), and the path to him staying a starting pitcher is much clearer. It also means he'll likely stay in the minors to start the season.
This also gives the Red Sox some substantial financial wiggle room. According to Scott Lauber, of the Boston Herald, the Red Sox had about $7 million of salary room before they'd hit the luxury cap threshold. If Ryan Dempster were placed on the restricted list, likely given his decision not to pitch this year, the Red Sox wouldn't be responsible for his $13.25 million salary, nor would it count against the luxury tax threshold. Now, the Red Sox have about $20 million to play with, allowing them to either resign Stephen Drew or give them the flexibility to make multiple major in-season acquisitions without surpassing the threshold.
Finally, best of luck to Ryan Dempster in his future endeavors. At 36 and dealing with nagging injuries, it is completely understandable that he is ready to put his family first. It is also remarkable that he is willing to give up $13 million because he doesn't think he can do an acceptable job pitching this year. He's already made almost $90 million in his career, so hopefully his family will be set for generations to come.
Saturday, February 15, 2014
Those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it
Ruben Amaro Jr. recently discussed the ill-fated Ryan Howard contract. It probably wasn't the most pleasant thing to have brought up in his interview with Ken Rosenthal, but given how the deal has backfired, it is understandably a topic of conversation. Of course, this isn't exactly surprising. The deal was fairly universally panned at the time, including in one of my earliest posts, for many reasons. Howard couldn't play defense, his skill set (often called "old player skills" - lots of walks, home runs, and strikeouts) tended to decline rapidly, he was rather old for his service time as he had been blocked in Philly by Jim Thome, and perhaps worst of all, it was made almost two full seasons before Howard was going to be a free agent. Ryan Howard's most similar players through that stage of his career were Cecil Fielder and Richie Sexson, both of whom flamed out fast and hard in their early 30s, and Howard was 30 at the time of the extension. Quite simply, there was absolutely no reason to make that decision at that point.
Tuesday, December 17, 2013
Revisiting the Red Sox' last great, MLB ready hitting prospect
There has been a lot of talk about Xander Bogaerts and his upside, and rightfully so. As a 20 year old he destroyed AAA, held his own in the regular season hitting .250/.320/.364, before becoming an onbase machine in the playoffs, posting a .412 OBP to go with his .482 slugging. Coming in to this year, Baseball America ranked him as the #8 prospect in the game. His spectacular season, coupled with some graduations and disappointments, has him in the running for the #1 spot overall. It has been a little while since the Red Sox had such a highly regarded hitter ready to contribute at the major league level, and I thought it would be interesting to take a look at past top prospects.
Who it isn't
As I made this only about hitting prospects, we can leave out Clay Buchholz (#4 in 2008) and Daisuke Matsuzaka (#1 in 2007, but he doesn't really count as a prospect anyway). Jon Lester didn't even crack the top 20 at his peak (#22 in 2006). Recently departed center fielder Jacoby Ellsbury reached #13 in 2007, but failed to be a top 10 prospect. Nor is it anyone who is still in the Red Sox organization. Dustin Pedroia, perhaps the best player on the Red Sox team right now, topped out at #77 following the 2005 season. Baseball America would probably like to have that one back, but there were real concerns about Pedroia's size, ability to generate any power, and his rather unorthodox "swing as hard as I can but still make contact all the time" approach. I think those things led some folks to wonder if he could hack it against major league pitching. Thankfully, they were wrong.
Hanley Ramirez is probably the closest "obvious" name out there. He was ranked #10 by Baseball America for the upcoming 2005 season, but after scuffling in AA, I think it would be a stretch to call him a consensus major league ready player. Granted, he went on to be an instant star for the Marlins, but I don't think anyone saw that coming, maybe even the Marlins.
Who it isn't
As I made this only about hitting prospects, we can leave out Clay Buchholz (#4 in 2008) and Daisuke Matsuzaka (#1 in 2007, but he doesn't really count as a prospect anyway). Jon Lester didn't even crack the top 20 at his peak (#22 in 2006). Recently departed center fielder Jacoby Ellsbury reached #13 in 2007, but failed to be a top 10 prospect. Nor is it anyone who is still in the Red Sox organization. Dustin Pedroia, perhaps the best player on the Red Sox team right now, topped out at #77 following the 2005 season. Baseball America would probably like to have that one back, but there were real concerns about Pedroia's size, ability to generate any power, and his rather unorthodox "swing as hard as I can but still make contact all the time" approach. I think those things led some folks to wonder if he could hack it against major league pitching. Thankfully, they were wrong.
Hanley Ramirez is probably the closest "obvious" name out there. He was ranked #10 by Baseball America for the upcoming 2005 season, but after scuffling in AA, I think it would be a stretch to call him a consensus major league ready player. Granted, he went on to be an instant star for the Marlins, but I don't think anyone saw that coming, maybe even the Marlins.
Thursday, December 5, 2013
Sox sign Edward Mujica, Uehara lite?
Today, December 5th 2013, the Red Sox announced a 2 year, $9.25 million contract with former Cardinal closer Edward Mujica. This comes 364 days after the Red Sox signed former Ranger reliever Koji Uehara to a one year, $4.25 million deal with a vesting option.
A quick glance at Mujica's season statistics indicate some cause for concern. First, his strikeout rate in 2013 was below average, at a rather pedestrian 6.40. For comparison, all pitchers struck out 7.57 batters per nine innings, while relievers struck out batters even more frequently (8.29 K/9). Second, Mujica's shiny ERA (2.87) masks a Fielding Independent Pitching (FIP) ERA of 3.71, precisely reliever average. Third, although Mujica recorded 37 saves in 2013, he imploded in September posting an 11.05 ERA and was a non-factor in the Cardinal's World Series run, throwing only 2 innings in the entire postseason.
However, I believe this is a solid signing for the Red Sox and Mujica could return a great value for them just as Uehara has. Why?
A quick glance at Mujica's season statistics indicate some cause for concern. First, his strikeout rate in 2013 was below average, at a rather pedestrian 6.40. For comparison, all pitchers struck out 7.57 batters per nine innings, while relievers struck out batters even more frequently (8.29 K/9). Second, Mujica's shiny ERA (2.87) masks a Fielding Independent Pitching (FIP) ERA of 3.71, precisely reliever average. Third, although Mujica recorded 37 saves in 2013, he imploded in September posting an 11.05 ERA and was a non-factor in the Cardinal's World Series run, throwing only 2 innings in the entire postseason.
However, I believe this is a solid signing for the Red Sox and Mujica could return a great value for them just as Uehara has. Why?
Wednesday, December 4, 2013
Sox pick the middle ground at catcher, waste money
I understand why some writers, such as Buster Olney, Tim Kurkijan, and Gordon Edes, and are saying that the Red Sox made a good choice in sticking with a short term solution at catcher, leaving room for their prospects to make an impact in 2015. I don't have a problem with the decision to not block Christian Vazquez and Blake Swihart, in fact I advocated it in an earlier post. However, Pierzynski is an $8.25 million lateral move from guys like Ryan Lavarnway or Dan Butler. To quote Keith Law (ESPN Insider only), "Pierzynski doesn't get on base, doesn't hit for power, and is a
below-average receiver, now entering his age 37 season and looking
slower than ever at the plate."
Friday, November 22, 2013
The do-nothing solution at catcher
If the Red Sox miss out on Brian McCann and Jarrod Saltalamacchia, the presumed solution is to go after Dioner Navarro. Despite playing only half a season, Navarro had the 2nd best season of his career (by wins above replacement) and set career highs for batting average, OBP, and slugging (.300/.365/.492). For comparison, those numbers actually top expected $100 million dollar man Brian McCann's .256/.336/.461 line across the board. Granted, no one is expecting Navarro to top McCann in 2014. Despite that, the Red Sox would do well to avoid Navarro.
Friday, November 15, 2013
Starting Pitching Primer, or, Is John Lackey's Contract Just like the Sox?
The Red Sox find themselves in an interesting position with starting pitching, heading in to 2014. Most importantly, they don't need to be involved in the starting pitching free agent market. There is a paucity of starters on the market, especially top tier arms, and every pitcher available has some real question marks around them.
Masahiro Tanaka, from the Japanese Pacific League, is coming off an incredible 24-0 season and is expected to be posted. However, importing Japanese pitchers has been a mixed bag - sometimes you get Darvish, sometimes you get Daisuke, and the cost could be well over $100 million. Ubaldo Jimenez and Ervin Santana are the next best arms available, and both were good pitchers in 2013, but both were also among the worst pitchers in baseball in 2012. Santana is looking for 5 years, $100 million, and Jimenez is likely looking in the same neighborhood. Finally, Ricky Nolasco is the final pitcher in Keith Law's top 50 free agents. Nolasco is looking for 5 years, $80 million on a track record that doesn't look substantively different from Ryan Dempster's last fall. A solid, if unspectacular track record of throwing 180-200 innings. There is some value in that, but I'm of the mind it falls a lot closer to Dempster's two year, $26.5 million deal, than Nolasco's aspirations.
Masahiro Tanaka, from the Japanese Pacific League, is coming off an incredible 24-0 season and is expected to be posted. However, importing Japanese pitchers has been a mixed bag - sometimes you get Darvish, sometimes you get Daisuke, and the cost could be well over $100 million. Ubaldo Jimenez and Ervin Santana are the next best arms available, and both were good pitchers in 2013, but both were also among the worst pitchers in baseball in 2012. Santana is looking for 5 years, $100 million, and Jimenez is likely looking in the same neighborhood. Finally, Ricky Nolasco is the final pitcher in Keith Law's top 50 free agents. Nolasco is looking for 5 years, $80 million on a track record that doesn't look substantively different from Ryan Dempster's last fall. A solid, if unspectacular track record of throwing 180-200 innings. There is some value in that, but I'm of the mind it falls a lot closer to Dempster's two year, $26.5 million deal, than Nolasco's aspirations.
The defensive cost of losing Drew
Defensively speaking, how much would the hit be to switch from Drew and Bogaerts at shortstop and third, respectively, to Bogaerts and Middlebrooks? This is a tricky question to answer, because you're trying to project two very young, unpredictable players in Middlebrooks and Bogaerts. On top of that, Drew had a gruesome ankle injury at the end of 2010, which makes his 2011 numbers an outlier.
Bogaerts at short and third
In a comment on an earlier post, I was asked about what to make of the fact that Bogaerts was a plus defender at short and a well below average one at third. The simple answer here is not much. Bogaerts only logged 110 innings in the field and defensive stats don’t even stabilize in a single season, so his numbers overall aren’t meaningful, let along splitting them up by position. Scouts say that Bogaerts would be an about average shortstop, so the simplest thing would just be to give him a 0 for defense. At shortstop, that’s no small feat. At third, it becomes less clear. The rough estimate would be that he would be save 5 runs, per calculations by Tom Tango.
Friday, November 8, 2013
Looking Ahead: Losses
After winning the championship, the Red Sox have a lot of players coming off the books. These include core contributors, including the entire swath of up the middle hitters, and guys you may have forgotten will be getting a ring for 2013.
Oh yeah, you were on the team (2013 salary)
Joel Hanrahan ($7.04)
Just as with Bailey, Hanrahan came over in a trade with the Pirates, in one of the larger moves of the offseason (or so we thought at the time). Unfortunately, Hanrahan was bad, then injured. He pitched a mere seven innings ($1 million/inning!), before undergoing Tommy John Surgery. Given that he's a Proven CloserTM, someone will probably take a flier on him on a one year deal with a team option, but we're probably looking at a return around the All Star Break next season. He won't be a great loss, doubly so given the emergence of Uehara as a closer and Uehara's affordable $4.25 million option, which vested in September, but the $7 million is always nice to have.
Joel Hanrahan ($7.04)
Just as with Bailey, Hanrahan came over in a trade with the Pirates, in one of the larger moves of the offseason (or so we thought at the time). Unfortunately, Hanrahan was bad, then injured. He pitched a mere seven innings ($1 million/inning!), before undergoing Tommy John Surgery. Given that he's a Proven CloserTM, someone will probably take a flier on him on a one year deal with a team option, but we're probably looking at a return around the All Star Break next season. He won't be a great loss, doubly so given the emergence of Uehara as a closer and Uehara's affordable $4.25 million option, which vested in September, but the $7 million is always nice to have.
Wednesday, November 6, 2013
Rebooting the blog to bask in the brilliance of a championship
It's been an awfully long time, but I wanted to try and start writing again, in part to enjoy the current success of the Red Sox, and in part to get in the practice of writing a lot, to help with my dissertation.
I'll be looking at free agent losses, the roster as it stands for 2014, upcoming prospects, and free agents in the next week or two.
I'll be looking at free agent losses, the roster as it stands for 2014, upcoming prospects, and free agents in the next week or two.
Saturday, May 11, 2013
An Extremely Unusual Start
On Friday night, Alex Cobb had one of the most unusual lines you'll ever see from a starting pitcher.
4 2/3 IP, 13 K, 2 BB, 5 H, 2 ER
So, Cobb got a total of 14 outs. Twelve were via the strikeout (one of the strikeouts reached first on a wild pitch). Two of the hits were home runs. That means that Cobb only had five balls in play. Of those five balls in play, two were infield singles and two were ground outs.
Looking at the underlying numbers, Cobb was just as dominant. Of Cobb's 117 pitches, 77 were strikes, for an about average total. However, aside from the two home runs, the Padres were clear completely lost at the plate. They swung at 57 pitches and swung and missed at 22 of them (38%). For comparison, 10% is a good swinging strike rate, and Yu Darvish has the highest swinging strike rate on the season (16.7%).
To top it all off, Cobb managed to strike out four batters in the third inning. Despite that, he allowed a run, as Will Venable reached on a wild pitch strike out, stole second, stole third, and then scored on a balk. Cobb then struck out Yonder Alonso to end the inning. It was only the 30th time than an AL pitcher has struck out four players in an inning and the 60th overall. Striking out four batters in an inning is one of the rarest occurrences in baseball, just behind a perfect game and the unassisted triple play.
All told, this might have been the most dominant start when a starter didn't even manage to qualify for a win.
4 2/3 IP, 13 K, 2 BB, 5 H, 2 ER
So, Cobb got a total of 14 outs. Twelve were via the strikeout (one of the strikeouts reached first on a wild pitch). Two of the hits were home runs. That means that Cobb only had five balls in play. Of those five balls in play, two were infield singles and two were ground outs.
Looking at the underlying numbers, Cobb was just as dominant. Of Cobb's 117 pitches, 77 were strikes, for an about average total. However, aside from the two home runs, the Padres were clear completely lost at the plate. They swung at 57 pitches and swung and missed at 22 of them (38%). For comparison, 10% is a good swinging strike rate, and Yu Darvish has the highest swinging strike rate on the season (16.7%).
To top it all off, Cobb managed to strike out four batters in the third inning. Despite that, he allowed a run, as Will Venable reached on a wild pitch strike out, stole second, stole third, and then scored on a balk. Cobb then struck out Yonder Alonso to end the inning. It was only the 30th time than an AL pitcher has struck out four players in an inning and the 60th overall. Striking out four batters in an inning is one of the rarest occurrences in baseball, just behind a perfect game and the unassisted triple play.
All told, this might have been the most dominant start when a starter didn't even manage to qualify for a win.
Wednesday, May 1, 2013
On swinging strikes, swings in the zone (or lack thereof), and strike outs
Following up on the comment on my Clay Buchholz piece, I wanted to examine how the swing percentage on pitches in the strike zone impacted strikeout rate. Thanks to Fangraphs excellent and customizable leader boards, I was able to get data for pitchers from 2006 to 2012 who threw for 100 or more innings. I did not want to go much farther back, as strikeout rates have changed considerably over the last few years, but also, swinging strike percent and swing rate on pitches in the zone are not available prior to 2005.
What are the Data I'm Using?
So, given 100 IP in a single season from 2006 to 2012, I had 986 total records from 306 different pitchers to go with. For simplicity's sake, I'm going to treat each season as independent, even though we might expect different seasons from the same pitcher to be related.
Creating the Basic Model
I used these 986 data points to create a linear model predicting strike out rate in K/9 IP using the swinging strike percentage. I originally considered adding the season to the model, as strikeout rates have steadily risen over the time period I'm looking at. While season was a significant predictor of K/9 IP when it was included in the model (more recent = more strikeouts), it didn't add much to the overall fit and only had a very minor impact on the model overall. In ecology, we often describe this as statistically significant, but not biologically significant. It often happens when you have a large sample size. Also, in general, I strongly prefer the simplest model possible, especially when adding variables marginally improves the fit. Guess I'm just a big fan of Occam's Razor. Without further ado, the relationship between swinging strike rate and strikeout rate is:
K/9 = 71.8*(Swinging Strike %) + 0.7892
The R2 for this model was 0.6693, meaning that swinging strike rate explains 67% of the variability in K/9. That is a huge proportion, but it does leave room for improvement.
Examining the Residuals
A residual is the difference between the expected value from the model and the actual model. A positive residual means that the pitcher had more strike outs than our swinging strike model thought they should, while a negative residual means the opposite. In general, a lower residual means a better fit for the model, but you can also look at the residuals to see if there is anything consistent about them. In our case, we’ll look at the percent of swings on pitches in the zone. To do this, I ran another linear regression, trying to predict the residuals using the zone swing percent. This showed a significant trend, but with a much lower predictive value than the swinging strike rate (R2=0.136). When your residuals have a trend, it means that your model isn’t capturing something, but for our purposes, it is a good thing. It means that when pitchers have a lower rate of swings against pitches in the zone, they have a higher strikeout rate.
The Low Swing Pitchers
Over the entire data set, the average swing rate at pitches in the zone was 65%. Unlike some other stats, there isn’t as much variability in swing rates at pitches in the zone. The lowest average belongs to Doug Fister (55.5%, over the course of three seasons), while the highest belongs to Scott Baker (72%, over two seasons). Another way to look at the data is to examine whether or not the pitchers with the low swing rates on pitches in the zone have a high residual. In short, the answer is yes. Four pitchers averaged a zone swinging rate of 60% or lower, and had multiple seasons on record. Here are their numbers – remember, a positive residual means that a pitcher was striking out more batters than the model predicted.
So, we see a consistent pattern at the extreme ends. But, does swing rate on pitches in the strike zone explain most of the variability in K/9?
The Biggest Departures from the Model
To examine this, I looked at the pitchers who had: 1. The highest residuals, and 2. At least three years of data. If the biggest departures from our expected results (largest residuals), all have a lower than average swing rate on pitches within the zone, that would provide even stronger support that swing rate within the strike zone controls how . Of the 15 pitchers with the highest average residuals, only two have swing rates below 60% (Mussina and Wilson), while an additional six have zone swing rates slightly below average (60-64%), and five have zone swing rates that are about average (64%-66%). None of the pitchers with consistently high residuals have above average zone swing rates. Interestingly, many of the high residual pitchers who had average to slightly below average zone swing rates also walked a lot of batters. If you increase the number of walks you hand out, you'll also increase the number of batters you face, which in turn should lead to a higher K/9. For example, think about two different pitchers. Pitcher A strikes out 25% of the batters he faces and walks 10% (Yovanni Gallardo) and pitcher B strikes out 25% of the batters he faces and walks 6%. Pitcher B is clearly the superior pitcher, but pitcher A will likely have a higher K/9.
So What Does This All Mean?
I think there are several conclusions we can draw here. First, a lower swing rate at pitches in the strike zone does consistently lead to a higher K/9. Second, if a pitcher has a high swing rate at pitches in the zone, they probably won't outperform their predicted K/9 based on swinging strike rate. This makes sense; lots of swings will lead to more balls in play, which in turn will lead to fewer strikeouts. Third, there are other factors that aren't captured by just looking at swinging strike rate and zone swing rate. Most of the pitchers with the highest residuals in the model did not have extremely low zone swing rates. This may be attributable to "stuff" in general, so perhaps delving into PitchFX data would lead to a clearer picture there.
What are the Data I'm Using?
So, given 100 IP in a single season from 2006 to 2012, I had 986 total records from 306 different pitchers to go with. For simplicity's sake, I'm going to treat each season as independent, even though we might expect different seasons from the same pitcher to be related.
Creating the Basic Model
I used these 986 data points to create a linear model predicting strike out rate in K/9 IP using the swinging strike percentage. I originally considered adding the season to the model, as strikeout rates have steadily risen over the time period I'm looking at. While season was a significant predictor of K/9 IP when it was included in the model (more recent = more strikeouts), it didn't add much to the overall fit and only had a very minor impact on the model overall. In ecology, we often describe this as statistically significant, but not biologically significant. It often happens when you have a large sample size. Also, in general, I strongly prefer the simplest model possible, especially when adding variables marginally improves the fit. Guess I'm just a big fan of Occam's Razor. Without further ado, the relationship between swinging strike rate and strikeout rate is:
K/9 = 71.8*(Swinging Strike %) + 0.7892
The R2 for this model was 0.6693, meaning that swinging strike rate explains 67% of the variability in K/9. That is a huge proportion, but it does leave room for improvement.
Examining the Residuals
A residual is the difference between the expected value from the model and the actual model. A positive residual means that the pitcher had more strike outs than our swinging strike model thought they should, while a negative residual means the opposite. In general, a lower residual means a better fit for the model, but you can also look at the residuals to see if there is anything consistent about them. In our case, we’ll look at the percent of swings on pitches in the zone. To do this, I ran another linear regression, trying to predict the residuals using the zone swing percent. This showed a significant trend, but with a much lower predictive value than the swinging strike rate (R2=0.136). When your residuals have a trend, it means that your model isn’t capturing something, but for our purposes, it is a good thing. It means that when pitchers have a lower rate of swings against pitches in the zone, they have a higher strikeout rate.
The Low Swing Pitchers
Over the entire data set, the average swing rate at pitches in the zone was 65%. Unlike some other stats, there isn’t as much variability in swing rates at pitches in the zone. The lowest average belongs to Doug Fister (55.5%, over the course of three seasons), while the highest belongs to Scott Baker (72%, over two seasons). Another way to look at the data is to examine whether or not the pitchers with the low swing rates on pitches in the zone have a high residual. In short, the answer is yes. Four pitchers averaged a zone swinging rate of 60% or lower, and had multiple seasons on record. Here are their numbers – remember, a positive residual means that a pitcher was striking out more batters than the model predicted.
| Name |
Seasons
|
Residual (K/9)
|
Zone Swing %
|
| Doug Fister |
3
|
0.873
|
55.5%
|
| C.J. Wilson |
3
|
1.678
|
57.5%
|
| Jake Arrieta |
3
|
0.992
|
59.2%
|
| Mike Mussina |
3
|
1.476
|
59.4%
|
So, we see a consistent pattern at the extreme ends. But, does swing rate on pitches in the strike zone explain most of the variability in K/9?
The Biggest Departures from the Model
To examine this, I looked at the pitchers who had: 1. The highest residuals, and 2. At least three years of data. If the biggest departures from our expected results (largest residuals), all have a lower than average swing rate on pitches within the zone, that would provide even stronger support that swing rate within the strike zone controls how . Of the 15 pitchers with the highest average residuals, only two have swing rates below 60% (Mussina and Wilson), while an additional six have zone swing rates slightly below average (60-64%), and five have zone swing rates that are about average (64%-66%). None of the pitchers with consistently high residuals have above average zone swing rates. Interestingly, many of the high residual pitchers who had average to slightly below average zone swing rates also walked a lot of batters. If you increase the number of walks you hand out, you'll also increase the number of batters you face, which in turn should lead to a higher K/9. For example, think about two different pitchers. Pitcher A strikes out 25% of the batters he faces and walks 10% (Yovanni Gallardo) and pitcher B strikes out 25% of the batters he faces and walks 6%. Pitcher B is clearly the superior pitcher, but pitcher A will likely have a higher K/9.
| Name |
Seasons
|
Residual (K/9)
|
Zone Swing %
|
| Yovani Gallardo |
4
|
2.065
|
62.0%
|
| C.J. Wilson |
3
|
1.678
|
57.5%
|
| Erik Bedard |
3
|
1.623
|
64.2%
|
| Mike Mussina |
3
|
1.476
|
59.4%
|
| David Price |
4
|
1.343
|
64.8%
|
| Ubaldo Jimenez |
4
|
1.272
|
63.7%
|
| Tim Lincecum |
5
|
1.258
|
63.4%
|
| Zack Greinke |
5
|
1.179
|
64.7%
|
| Jonathan Sanchez |
4
|
1.176
|
62.3%
|
| Clayton Kershaw |
5
|
1.169
|
63.4%
|
| Oliver Perez |
3
|
1.154
|
64.7%
|
| Tommy Hanson |
3
|
1.148
|
63.0%
|
| Josh Beckett |
6
|
1.134
|
64.9%
|
| Daniel Cabrera |
3
|
1.119
|
64.8%
|
| Jon Lester |
4
|
1.112
|
65.7%
|
So What Does This All Mean?
I think there are several conclusions we can draw here. First, a lower swing rate at pitches in the strike zone does consistently lead to a higher K/9. Second, if a pitcher has a high swing rate at pitches in the zone, they probably won't outperform their predicted K/9 based on swinging strike rate. This makes sense; lots of swings will lead to more balls in play, which in turn will lead to fewer strikeouts. Third, there are other factors that aren't captured by just looking at swinging strike rate and zone swing rate. Most of the pitchers with the highest residuals in the model did not have extremely low zone swing rates. This may be attributable to "stuff" in general, so perhaps delving into PitchFX data would lead to a clearer picture there.
Monday, April 29, 2013
What has improved with Clay Buchholz?
Clay Buchholz has been the Red Sox best pitcher, and even edges out Dustin Pedroia as the Red Sox best player overall. He currently has a spectacular 1.19 ERA, and even more surprisingly, is striking out more than a batter per inning. While the ERA obviously won’t stay below 1.50, I thought it was worth a closer look to try and figure out where his strikeouts are coming from.
What Hasn’t Changed?
Before we get into the details too much, it is important to round up the usual suspects. Buchholz is not throwing a new pitch; he is still using the fastball, cutter, change up, and curveball that he has since introducing the cutter in 2011. Nor has he changed his approach. Buchholz still throws his four seam fastball about half the time and his cutter about 20% of the time, followed by his curveball and changeup with about equal frequency. Since Buchholz was hampered by injuries to start 2012, you might expect an increase in velocity, now that he is healthy, but we also don’t see a surge in velocity for Buchholz. In fact, Buchholz’s fastball is about one mile per hour slower than 2012. Buchholz’s control isn’t better either – he is still walking about the same number of batters (3.11/9 IP) and he is throwing the same number of first pitch strikes, too. Finally, and most perplexingly, we don’t see a change in his swinging strike rate.
Swinging Strikes and Strikeouts
The big surge in strikeouts without an increase in swinging strikes is very odd. Swinging strikes and strikeout rates are tightly linked (R2 = 0.65 in 2012 for qualified pitchers), and swinging strike rate usually stabilizes before strikeout rate. Without an increase in swinging strikes, we should probably expect to see a big drop in Buchholz’s strikeout rate over the rest of the season. Needless to say, that would mean that he wouldn’t be the ace we’ve seen in the first month. Based on a linear regression from last season’s stats (it is still a bit early to be using 2013 stats), we should expect Buchholz to have a K/9 of 6.67, instead of 9.32. That strikeout rate would mean his expected ERA (xFIP) would be about 4.00 – hardly an ace, and maybe not even a #2.
A Silver Lining
There is one metric that Buchholz has improved significantly in – batters are swinging much less often at pitches in the zone this year (58%, compared to 65% in 2012). Currently, a 58% swing rate at pitches in the zone is the 10th best in the majors, and would have led the league last year. If batters aren’t swinging at pitches in the zone, that could mean two different things: 1. Batters are getting fooled by Buchholz’s pitchers, or 2. Buchholz is working the corners effectively, so although the pitches are in the zone, they are not good ones to hit. Looking at Buchholz’s heat maps showing where he is throwing pitches, nothing immediately jumps out at me to indicate that Buchholz is working corners better than previous years, however it is rather hard to compare the 2013 season to previous years because of the big difference in number of pitches thrown.
Trickier Pitches?
If Buchholz is fooling batters, we might be able to see some improvement in the movement of his pitches. Thanks to PitchFX data, we have an amazing treasure trove of data. There is not a significant change in the amount of movement for Buchholz’s changeup or curveball, but he has added an inch of movement on his fastball and cutter (this combines both horizontal and vertical movement). Most of the movement for the cutter has been horizontal movement, which is not surprising as cutters often have more run when thrown slightly slower, and Buchholz is throwing his cutter two and a half miles per hour slower than last year. However, of the two pitches, only the four seam fastball has shown improvement. A big part of that improvement has been in the swing rate within the zone, as hitters have offered at fastballs in the zone 7% less often in 2013. The biggest improvement in that category is with the curveball; hitters have gone from swinging at curveballs in the zone 42% of the time, to an incredibly low 22% of the time. Although the overall movement of the curveball hasn’t changed, how it is moving has. Over his career, Buchholz has gone from having a fairly traditional 12-6 curveball (one that drops pretty much straight down, from 12 o’clock to 6 o’clock, if you were looking at a clock face) to one that has a lot more horizontal movement; at this point, he’s almost throwing a slurve (combination of a slider and a curveball), with over 10” of horizontal movement. Traditionally, most scouts prefer a 12-6 curveball, and a slurve often has a bad reputation, however, this pitch is working for Buchholz.
Looking Ahead
Whether or not the slurve remains effective, particularly in getting called strikes, will be key for Buchholz’s continued success. I think a lot of that will depend on whether or not hitters adjust to the new, more horizontal movement of the pitch. If he can continue to fool hitters, he may be able to maintain an elevated strikeout rate, without having a typically high swinging strike rate. A regression to model strikeout rate using swinging strikeout rate and zone swing percentage indicated that a lower swing rate at pitches in the zone leads to a higher strikeout rate overall, and greatly improves the fit of the model (R2 = 0.83, compared to 0.65 with just swinging strike rate). According to that model, Buchholz’s K/9 IP would be about 7.50, leading to a much more palatable predicted ERA of about 3.50. Now that looks more like a #2 starter.
What Hasn’t Changed?
Before we get into the details too much, it is important to round up the usual suspects. Buchholz is not throwing a new pitch; he is still using the fastball, cutter, change up, and curveball that he has since introducing the cutter in 2011. Nor has he changed his approach. Buchholz still throws his four seam fastball about half the time and his cutter about 20% of the time, followed by his curveball and changeup with about equal frequency. Since Buchholz was hampered by injuries to start 2012, you might expect an increase in velocity, now that he is healthy, but we also don’t see a surge in velocity for Buchholz. In fact, Buchholz’s fastball is about one mile per hour slower than 2012. Buchholz’s control isn’t better either – he is still walking about the same number of batters (3.11/9 IP) and he is throwing the same number of first pitch strikes, too. Finally, and most perplexingly, we don’t see a change in his swinging strike rate.
Swinging Strikes and Strikeouts
The big surge in strikeouts without an increase in swinging strikes is very odd. Swinging strikes and strikeout rates are tightly linked (R2 = 0.65 in 2012 for qualified pitchers), and swinging strike rate usually stabilizes before strikeout rate. Without an increase in swinging strikes, we should probably expect to see a big drop in Buchholz’s strikeout rate over the rest of the season. Needless to say, that would mean that he wouldn’t be the ace we’ve seen in the first month. Based on a linear regression from last season’s stats (it is still a bit early to be using 2013 stats), we should expect Buchholz to have a K/9 of 6.67, instead of 9.32. That strikeout rate would mean his expected ERA (xFIP) would be about 4.00 – hardly an ace, and maybe not even a #2.
A Silver Lining
There is one metric that Buchholz has improved significantly in – batters are swinging much less often at pitches in the zone this year (58%, compared to 65% in 2012). Currently, a 58% swing rate at pitches in the zone is the 10th best in the majors, and would have led the league last year. If batters aren’t swinging at pitches in the zone, that could mean two different things: 1. Batters are getting fooled by Buchholz’s pitchers, or 2. Buchholz is working the corners effectively, so although the pitches are in the zone, they are not good ones to hit. Looking at Buchholz’s heat maps showing where he is throwing pitches, nothing immediately jumps out at me to indicate that Buchholz is working corners better than previous years, however it is rather hard to compare the 2013 season to previous years because of the big difference in number of pitches thrown.
Trickier Pitches?
If Buchholz is fooling batters, we might be able to see some improvement in the movement of his pitches. Thanks to PitchFX data, we have an amazing treasure trove of data. There is not a significant change in the amount of movement for Buchholz’s changeup or curveball, but he has added an inch of movement on his fastball and cutter (this combines both horizontal and vertical movement). Most of the movement for the cutter has been horizontal movement, which is not surprising as cutters often have more run when thrown slightly slower, and Buchholz is throwing his cutter two and a half miles per hour slower than last year. However, of the two pitches, only the four seam fastball has shown improvement. A big part of that improvement has been in the swing rate within the zone, as hitters have offered at fastballs in the zone 7% less often in 2013. The biggest improvement in that category is with the curveball; hitters have gone from swinging at curveballs in the zone 42% of the time, to an incredibly low 22% of the time. Although the overall movement of the curveball hasn’t changed, how it is moving has. Over his career, Buchholz has gone from having a fairly traditional 12-6 curveball (one that drops pretty much straight down, from 12 o’clock to 6 o’clock, if you were looking at a clock face) to one that has a lot more horizontal movement; at this point, he’s almost throwing a slurve (combination of a slider and a curveball), with over 10” of horizontal movement. Traditionally, most scouts prefer a 12-6 curveball, and a slurve often has a bad reputation, however, this pitch is working for Buchholz.
Looking Ahead
Whether or not the slurve remains effective, particularly in getting called strikes, will be key for Buchholz’s continued success. I think a lot of that will depend on whether or not hitters adjust to the new, more horizontal movement of the pitch. If he can continue to fool hitters, he may be able to maintain an elevated strikeout rate, without having a typically high swinging strike rate. A regression to model strikeout rate using swinging strikeout rate and zone swing percentage indicated that a lower swing rate at pitches in the zone leads to a higher strikeout rate overall, and greatly improves the fit of the model (R2 = 0.83, compared to 0.65 with just swinging strike rate). According to that model, Buchholz’s K/9 IP would be about 7.50, leading to a much more palatable predicted ERA of about 3.50. Now that looks more like a #2 starter.
Koji Uehara in a Nutshell
This week was fairly representative of Uehara on the whole. He appeared in 4 games, throwing 4 innings. He showed excellent control, walking no one in those four innings, while striking out four batters. Unfortunately, Uehara gave up a couple of home runs - a shot to Billy Butler that tied the game in the 8th and a home run to Chris Young that cut the Sox lead against Oakland to one.
That is pretty much what you can expect from Uehara. Lots and lots of strikeouts (10.13/9 in 2013, 10.75 in 2012), almost no walks (a microscopic 0.84/9 in 2013, 0.75/9 in 2012), and lots of fly balls (59% in 2013, 51% in 2012). Sometimes, those fly balls are going to leave the yard, often times in bunches. Thankfully, they'll usually be solo home runs. The home run Uehara gave up to Butler was a crusher, leading to a Sox loss in extra innings, but on the whole Uehara is going to be an excellent contributor to the bullpen. The one thing we can't count on, though, is health. Uehara only threw 36 innings last year, and typically needs to have a day off between appearances. But while he is healthy, the Sox should enjoy the ride.
That is pretty much what you can expect from Uehara. Lots and lots of strikeouts (10.13/9 in 2013, 10.75 in 2012), almost no walks (a microscopic 0.84/9 in 2013, 0.75/9 in 2012), and lots of fly balls (59% in 2013, 51% in 2012). Sometimes, those fly balls are going to leave the yard, often times in bunches. Thankfully, they'll usually be solo home runs. The home run Uehara gave up to Butler was a crusher, leading to a Sox loss in extra innings, but on the whole Uehara is going to be an excellent contributor to the bullpen. The one thing we can't count on, though, is health. Uehara only threw 36 innings last year, and typically needs to have a day off between appearances. But while he is healthy, the Sox should enjoy the ride.
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